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Managerial know-how shapes the productivity of firms by defining the set of available technologies,
production choices, and market opportunities. This know-how can be reallocated across countries
as managers acquire control of factors of production abroad. In this paper, we construct a quantitative
model of cross-country income differences to study the aggregate consequences of international mobility
of managerial know-how. We use the model and aggregate data to infer the relative scarcity of this
form of know-how for a sample of developing countries. We also conduct policy counterfactuals and
find that on average, developing countries gain up to 23% in output and 9% in consumption when
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The diﬀusion of productive knowledge plays an important role in the literature on cross-
country income diﬀerences (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1998 and Klenow and Rodriguez-
Clare 2005). Much of the attention has been focused on ﬂows of knowledge embedded in
capital goods and in patents, and on the role of international trade and imitation in the
diﬀusion of ideas. Less attention has been given to the transfer of know-how that takes
place when management crosses borders to directly control inputs in a foreign country. Such
transfers, however, appear to be important in light of the large and fast growing multinational
activity observed in recent years.1 In this paper, we construct a quantitative model of cross-
country income diﬀerences to study the aggregate consequences of foreign management and
control of inputs in host countries.
There is a long tradition of linking the productivity of ﬁrms to the quality of their
management.2 Managerial know-how shapes the productivity of ﬁrms by governing the
set of available technologies, production choices, and market opportunities. This know-how
is costly to reproduce but can be imported from abroad as foreign management acquires
c o n t r o lo fl o c a li n p u t s .T oe v a l u a t et h ec o n s e q u e nces of policies that restrict the international
mobility of managerial know-how, it is essential to separate this component of productivity
from other complementary factors that are ﬁx e di ne a c hc o u n t r y .
We refer to those factors which are immobile across countries and that impact the produc-
tivity of all ﬁrms operating in the country, as “country-embedded productivity”. It includes,
for example, the infrastructure, regulations, natural amenities, and the quality of the local
labor force and other inputs that are ﬁx e di nt h ec o u n t r y .W er e f e rt ot h ek n o w - h o wo ft h e
individuals in control of the ﬁrm as “ﬁrm-embedded productivity”. Because of its human
aspect this factor has two important characteristics. First, it is a “rival” factor that is in
limited supply. At any point in time, employing the skills of an individual in one task or lo-
cation precludes them from being used in another one. Second, ﬁrm-embedded productivity
can be reallocated across sectors, regions and, albeit imperfectly, across countries.
Consider the case of wine production. Making wine is mostly a matter of the choices made
1See chapter 1 of Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004) and references therein for an account of the
impressive growth of multinational ﬁrms during the last two decades of the 20th century.
2See, for example, Kaldor (1934), Lucas (1978), Oi (1983), Prescott and Visscher (1980), and Rosen
(1982). Bloom and Van Reenen (2006) provide survey evidence that managerial practice is strongly associated
with ﬁrm-level performance.
2during each phase of production, from choosing the grapes to bottling and marketing the
ﬁnished product. Country-embedded productivity includes the quality of the soil, rainfall,
sunlight, water, as well as appellations, seals of origin, and other amenities. Firm-embedded
productivity is given by the viticultural and enological know-how of winemakers, as well as
their connections and knowledge of the relevant markets. The international mobility of ﬁrm-
embedded productivity is illustrated by winemakers such as Gallo, Mondavi, and Rothschild,
who export their know-how to produce wine faraway from their traditional ‘terroirs’.3
The mobility of ﬁrm-embedded productivity across cou n t r i e sc o n f o r m sw i t ht h eo b s e r -
vation that multinational ﬁrms in developing countries rely largely on expatriates from the
source country for “senior management positions and key technical and engineering jobs to
execute sophisticated or specialized production tasks” (UNCTAD 1994, p. 238).4 Bloom,
Sadun and Van Reenen (2007) provide direct evidence that multinational ﬁrms transplant
their organization structure and managerial practices, and this shapes their productivity
abroad. Indeed, Bloom (2007) documents that foreign operations of ﬁrms from developed
countries (e.g., U.S. and Japan) are better managed than domestic ﬁrms in developing coun-
tries (e.g., China and India).
At the aggregate level, country- and ﬁrm-embedded productivity cannot be directly sep-
arated. For given levels of capital and labor, a combination of high country- and low ﬁrm-
embedded productivity can lead to the same observed output level as a combination of low
country- and high ﬁrm-embedded productivity. Firm-embedded productivity, however, is
a rival factor that can be reallocated across countries. To equalize the marginal product
across countries, ﬁrm-embedded productivity must ﬂow from countries where it is relatively
abundant to countries where it is scarce. Therefore, for the same measured level of output,
a high observed share of capital and labor controlled by foreign know-how indicates a high
ratio of country- to ﬁrm-embedded productivity.
We formalize this logic in a standard model of cross-country income diﬀerences, extended
with internationally mobile managerial know-how. We use the model and aggregate data to
disentangle country- and ﬁrm-embedded productivities for a sample of developing countries,
3For example, The Economist (“Vino Twin Peaks”, March 15, 2007) describes how the arrival of foreign
winemakers in Argentina led to a large increase of high quality wine exports over recent years. See Fisher
(1999) for a broader discussion on the globalization in wine production.
4The UNCTAD report provides evidence that the reliance on expatriates is greater in developing countries
than in developed countries. It also highlights the important role of foreign personnel in organizing the early
phases of the enterprise as well as training the local workers.
3and to conduct policy counterfactuals on changes in the barriers to foreign control of local
factors of production.
In our model, production is organized in teams composed of a top-level manager leading
a set of inputs. Inputs include middle managers, workers, and capital services. As in Lucas
(1978), we refer to these teams as “ﬁrms.” Firms have decreasing returns to scale in the
inputs controlled by the top manager. The productivity of a ﬁrm is the product of two
Hicks-neutral factors: the location of the ﬁrm (country-embedded productivity) and the
know-how of its top-level manager (ﬁrm-embedded productivity). Firm leaders from one
country can reallocate their know-how to another country and form teams with local inputs
a n dc a p i t a l .W er e f e rt os u c ht e a m sa sf o r e i g nﬁrms.5
Firms maximize proﬁts by choosing locations with high country-embedded productivity
and low factor prices. The worldwide equilibrium allocates ﬁrm-embedded productivity by
equalizing its marginal product (the ﬁrms’ proﬁts) across countries. Everything else equal,
a host country attracts more foreign ﬁrms, the higher its country-embedded productivity
and the lower its domestic ﬁrm-embedded productivity, both of which reduce the production
costs of foreign ﬁrms. This implication of our model echoes the result in Helpman (1984),
that inﬂows of vertical multinational ﬁrms are more prevalent in countries that are relatively
scarce in factors intensively used by headquarter services (e.g., management, marketing and
R&D) and relatively rich in factors intensively used in production activities (e.g., labor).
We use the model and aggregate data to separately measure the domestic endowment
of ﬁrm-embedded productivity and the level of country-embedded productivity. Observing
a higher share of factors controlled by foreign ﬁrms indicates, everything else the same, a
higher ratio of country-to-ﬁrm-embedded productivity. Similarly, a higher tax rate on foreign
proﬁts (for the same share of factors controlled by foreign ﬁrms) indicates a higher ratio of
country-to-ﬁrm-embedded productivity. In our model, we also allow for geographic barriers
that reduce the productivity of foreign ﬁrms, physical capital accumulation, and mobility
across occupations (workers, middle managers, and top managers) within countries.
In our quantitative analysis, we measure the aggregate share of inputs controlled by
foreign ﬁrms in host countries as the ratio of the stock of inward foreign direct investment
(FDI) to the stock of physical capital in each country. The measurement of FDI in the data is
closely connected to the cross-country reallocation of managerial know-how and control in our
5In this paper we assume a bounded aggregate supply of managerial know-how in each country. Monge-
Naranjo (2007) studies the dynamic accumulation of this factor in a model where it can move across countries.
4model, since it represents foreign investment undertaken with the objective of establishing
a lasting interest in the country, a long-term relationship, and a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the
management of the ﬁrm. As a robustness check, we also construct an alternative measure of
inputs controlled by foreign ﬁr m sb a s e do nt h es h a r eo fe ﬃciency units of labor controlled
by multinational ﬁrms (combining data on the wage bill of U.S. multinational ﬁrms and
inward stocks of FDI). Despite some important limitations, which are discussed below, both
measures can be constructed for a large set of host countries.
The average stocks of FDI for the period 1997-2000 (see Figure 1) show that most net
sources of FDI are developed countries, while most recipients of FDI are developing or
recently developed countries. In our quantitative analysis we construct a single net source
of ﬁrm-embedded know-how by aggregating the data for the largest net sources of FDI,
and use data for 38 individual net host countries.6 To account for the observed ﬂows of
FDI, our inference implies that developing countries are relatively scarce in ﬁrm-embedded
productivity. Under the inferred levels of country- and ﬁrm-embedded productivities, our
model replicates the observed share of capital controlled by foreign ﬁrms in each host country.
We abstract from the gross ﬂows of FDI within net exporters of FDI — which account for
the majority of gross-ﬂows of FDI worldwide — because our model does not include trade
frictions that play a key role in North-North multinational activity.7
We then perform accounting exercises using our model as an organizing framework. We
quantify the importance of ﬁxed country productivity factors (country-embedded produc-
tivity), internationally mobile productivity factors (ﬁrm-embedded productivity of home
and foreign ﬁrms), and physical capital stocks in accounting for cross-country diﬀerences
in per capita output observed in the data. We ﬁnd, in our baseline calculations, that dif-
ferences in country-embedded productivity, ﬁrm-embedded productivity of domestic ﬁrms,
and ﬁrm-embedded productivity of foreign ﬁrms account, and capital/output ratios, account
respectively, for 61%, 27%, −5% and 17% of the output diﬀerence between source and host
countries in the period 1997-2000. That is, the presence of foreign ﬁrms reduces the output
gap between developed and developing countries by roughly 5%.W eo b t a i ns i m i l a rn u m -
6Flows of FDI from developing to developed countries are small. For example, in 2001, 93% of all assets
controlled by foreign aﬃliates in the U.S. were owned by nationals of other developed countries. Flows from
developing to other developing countries also tend to be small. For example, during the 1990s, the fraction
of inﬂows of FDI originated from developed countries was 91% in Mexico, and roughly 80% in Argentina,
Costa Rica, and Peru (see Barba Navaretti and Venables 2004).
7See Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) for a model of horizontal FDI in which ﬁrms establish foreign
subsidiaries to serve the local market and avoid international trade costs.
5bers when accounting for the output dispersion across host countries, and when using our
alternative measures of the share of inputs controlled by foreign ﬁrms.
Next, we use our model to conduct policy counterfactuals. We quantify the aggregate
impact in host countries of removing taxes on the proﬁts of foreign ﬁrms. We identify three
key margins that determine the magnitude of the gains in aggregate output and welfare: (i)
the response in the inﬂow of ﬁrms, which largely depends on the degree of decreasing returns
to scale at the ﬁrm level; (ii) the response of capital accumulation, which depends on the
output share of capital; and (iii) the reallocation of agents across occupations, which depends
on the shape of the cross-section distribution of managerial skills. Under our parameteriza-
tion, the gains for host countries of moving from autarky to openness to foreign ﬁrms can be
substantial. When margins (ii)—(iii) are shut-down, the average gains in output and welfare
are 5% and 1%, respectively. When margins (ii)-(iii) are incorporated, the average gains
increase to 23% and 9%, respectively.
In related work, Ramondo (2006) constructs a quantitative model of multinational ac-
tivity in which ﬁrm-embedded productivity is a nonrival factor that can be simultaneously
used in many countries. Therefore, in contrast to our model, productivity inﬂows in host
countries do not involve productivity outﬂows in source countries. Antras, Garicano, and
Rossi-Hansberg (2006a and 2006b) model managerial knowledge as a rival factor, but their
focus is on the implications of North-South multinational activity on the assignment of indi-
viduals to tasks, and on the distribution of income. Our attention on the managerial know-
how of foreign-controlled ﬁrms also conforms with a large literature on multinational activity
that highlights the role of ﬁrm-speciﬁc intangible assets.8 Since prolonged and continuous
physical presence is not essential for eﬀective management and control, our framework is
also consistent with the model of Helpman (1984) in which headquarters provide managerial
services to foreign aﬃliates.
In this paper we provide a contribution towards an aggregate quantitative framework of
multinational activity and cross-country income diﬀerences. In doing so, we have abstracted
from some interesting issues regarding the international mobility of ﬁrms. For example,
our model does not deal with the endogenous choice of organization, either on the cross-
country within-ﬁrm allocation of skills and tasks, or on the choice between outsourcing and
integration (e.g., Helpman 1984, Grossman and Helpman 2003, Antras and Helpman 2004,
8See, for example, Barba-Navarretti and Venables (2004), Helleiner (1989), and Markusen (2004).
6and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2006). Our analysis also abstracts from the cross-country
mobility of workers (e.g., Rauch 1991, and Klein and Ventura 2006).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 uses a simple version of
our model to illustrate the equilibrium allocation of ﬁrm-embedded productivity and how
country- and ﬁrm-embedded productivities can be inferred from observed aggregate data.
Section 3 extends the basic model in three dimensions: geographic frictions and taxes, capital
accumulation, and occupation choice. Section 4 analyzes the equilibrium and inference of
country- and ﬁrm-embedded productivities in the extended model. Section 5 describes the
multicountry quantitative model, its calibration, and the quantitative results on the inference
of country and ﬁrm-embedded productivities. Section 6 presents the policy counterfactuals,
and Section 7 concludes. The Appendix contains some details of the quantitative model
omitted in the body of the paper.
2. A Basic Two-Country Model
In this section we use a simple model to illustrate the gains of reallocating managerial know-
how, or “ﬁrm-embedded productivity”, across countries. We also show how to use aggregate
data to infer the relative scarcity of ﬁrm-embedded productivity.
2.1. The Model
Consider a world of two countries, indexed by i =1 ,2 and a single, freely traded consumption
good. The population Li in each country is divided into a fraction ω of managers and a
fraction 1 − ω of workers, each endowed with one unit of time.
Production is organized in ﬁrms. A ﬁrm is a team of a manager and a set of workers
under his or her control. The productivity of a ﬁrm depends on two factors. The ﬁrst factor
is determined by the country where the ﬁrm operates. The second is determined by the
know-how of the manager.9
The ﬁr s tf a c t o ri sw h a tw ec a l l“ c o u n t r y - e m b e d d e dp r o d u c t i v i t y ” ,zi.I t i s a H i c k s i a n
shift in the productivity of all the ﬁrms producing in the country. It captures the infrastruc-
ture, regulation, natural amenities, unmeasured human capital of workers, and any other
9In our model, there are no gains or losses of consolidating many teams into one. Hence, we can re-
interpret any collection of teams as a ﬁrm, or equivalently we can re-interpret each team as a subset of the
operations of a ﬁrm. For examples of models in which integrating teams is not neutral, see Rosen (1982),
and Antras, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006b).
7nontradeable factor of production of the country.
The second factor, x,i sw h a tw ec a l lﬁrm-embedded productivity. It is the know-how
embedded in the manager that leads the team. Managers use their know-how in making and
implementing the critical technological, production, and marketing decisions relevant to a
ﬁrm. This know-how can be reallocated across countries. The ﬁrm-embedded productivity
x is also a Hicksian shift in the ﬁrm’s productivity. We assume for now that all managers
from country i a r ee n d o w e dw i t ht h es a m ev a l u exi > 0.





The parameter ν ∈ (0,1) determines the degree of diminishing returns to scale to the man-
ager’s control of other inputs.
In a competitive equilibrium, managers hire workers and earn the proﬁts of the ﬁrm. For
our purposes, it is instructive to examine world competitive equilibria under two diﬀerent
scenarios. In the ﬁrst, referred to as “autarky,” only local managers can lead ﬁrms in each
country. In the second scenario, referred to as “international ﬁrm mobility,” managers are
free to lead teams in any of the two countries. We always maintain the assumption that
workers are internationally immobile.
2.2. Autarky
Within countries, each identical manager controls n =( 1− ω)/ω units of labor. Summing










where µ ≡ ω1−ν (1 − ω)
ν. N o t i c et h a tt h et e r mzi (xi)
1−ν pins down per capita output in
each country. Note also that in autarky, zi and xi are indistinguishable.



















It is determined in part by the sorting of zi and xi across countries, since these two factors
are complementary. In general, there can be gains from reallocating managerial know-how
from countries where xi/zi is high, to countries where xi/zi is low.
82.3. International Firm Mobility
Assume now that managers can be reallocated across countries. For now assume that,
regardless of location, country i managers carry their ﬁrm-embedded productivity xi to
either country in which they operate.
Suppose that a fraction m ∈ (0,1) of country 1 managers operates in country 2.A s s u m e
also that all managers from country 2 operate in country 2. Therefore, with (1 − m)ωL1
managers operating in country 1,e a c ho n ec o n t r o l sn1
1 =( 1− ω)/[ω(1 − m)] workers. Ag-
gregate output in country 1 is
Y












1¢1−ν (1 − m)
1−ν L
1.
Country 2 hosts both domestic and foreign managers. Each domestic manager hires n2
2
workers, and each foreign manager hires n2
1 workers. Equalization of marginal products of




















2 =( 1− ω)L
2. (2.6)
Adding up output from domestic and foreign ﬁrms, and using (2.5) and (2.6), aggregate






























We solve for the international allocation of managerial know-how that maximizes world
output and show that it is also the outcome of a competitive equilibrium. The eﬃcient
allocation m∗ maximizes world output by equating the marginal product of managers across



















9Notice that a suﬃcient and necessary condition for country 2 to receive foreign managers










The ratio R provides the precise basis for comparing the relative scarcity of ﬁrm-embedded
productivity across countries. If the ratio is less than one, ﬁrm-embedded productivity is
scarce in country 2, and a social planner would transfer some of the managerial know-how
from country 1 to country 2. Observe that the host country attracts foreign ﬁrms either
because it is a relatively productive location (high z2/z1), or because it has a relatively low
endowment of ﬁrm-embedded productivity (low x2/x1). Relative population sizes also shape
the magnitude of inﬂows of foreign ﬁrms. If country 1 is relatively large, a smaller fraction of
its ﬁrm-embedded productivity needs to be reallocated to country 2 to equate the marginal
productivity of managers.
The world as a whole has an endowment of ﬁrm-embedded productivity equal to ω(L1x1 + L2x2),
and managers of both countries are perfect substitutes (at a rate x2/x1). In this setup, the
optimal allocation only pins down the net reallocation of managerial know-how. Many alter-
native patterns of gross ﬂows have the same output and welfare implications as long as they
imply the same aggregates of ﬁrm-embedded productivity allocated to each country. Our
assumption that m>0 and that all country 2 managers operate in country 2 is without loss
of generality as long as country 2 is a net recipient.














, i =1 ,2. (2.10)
The ﬁrst term is common to both countries. With ﬁrm mobility, relative output levels depend
only on immobile country factors (which are zi and Li).

















Note that world output depends on the world endowment of ﬁrm-embedded productivity,
and not on how it is initially distributed across countries. Moreover, world output is still
aﬀected by the sorting of populations Li and country-embedded productivities zi, which are
ﬁx e di ne a c hc o u n t r y .
10For our exercises, it is useful to compute the share of inputs that foreign ﬁrms control in
host countries. Given any m, the share of labor that country 1 ﬁrms control of the aggregate























The higher the share s, the higher the output in country 2, as it is hosting a larger amount
of ﬁrm-embedded productivity. Likewise, an increase in s lowers output in country 1.N o t e
that a larger output share of ﬁrm-embedded productivity, 1 − ν, raises the impact of an
increase in s on aggregate output.
Consumption in each country equals the sum of labor income and the proﬁts of its ﬁrms:
C
1 = Y
1 +( 1− ν)sY
2,a n dC
2 =[ 1− (1 − ν)s]Y
2. (2.14)
An increase in s leads to a larger increase in consumption than output in country 1 (output
actually falls), and a smaller increase in consumption than output in country 2.
To get a ﬁrst sense of magnitudes, let ν =0 .85 (which we justify below). Consider raising
s from zero (autarky) to 25% (roughly the share of factors that foreign ﬁrms controlled in
Dominican Republic on average during 1997-2000, based on the measures discussed below).
The resulting increment in output and consumption is 4.4% and 0.5%, respectively. These
gains are signiﬁcantly higher (up to 10 times for consumption) in the extended model that
includes capital accumulation, and endogenous occupation choice.
Eﬃcient allocations coincide with those in a competitive equilibria. To see this, let wi
b et h ew a g ei nc o u n t r yi and π
j
i be the proﬁts of ﬁrms from country i operating in country
j,g i v e nb y
π
j





























where κ = ν
ν
1−ν [1 − ν] > 0. Managers from both countries strictly prefer to operate in
country 2 if (w2/w1) < (z2/z1)
1/ν. In an interior equilibrium, managers are indiﬀerent
11between operating in the two locations, and therefore relative wages are pinned down by
relative country-embedded productivities.
Given m, we can solve for the equilibrium wages by combining the optimal labor choices


























1, coincides with the eﬃcient m∗.
2.4. Using Observed {Y i,L i,s} to Infer xi and zi
The endowments of country- and ﬁrm-embedded productivities, xi and zi, are not observed.
Inferring their values is essential to determine the output and consumption gains of inter-
national ﬁrm mobility. Note that, from expression (2.13), a given level of aggregate output
can result from many combinations of xi and zi, for a given share s. We now show how the
equilibrium determination of s allows us to separately infer xi and zi from aggregate data.
First, we can use the expression for equilibrium output, (2.10), to obtain an expression











This expression shows that, since mobile factors are being allocated to equalize their marginal
return across countries, output levels are entirely pinned down by factors that are immobile
across countries (zi and Li).
Second, we can infer relative ﬁrm-embedded productivities from the equalization of mar-
ginal products of managerial know-how across countries. Namely, combining the expression





















This expression indicates that the higher the fraction of inputs controlled by foreign ﬁrms,
the lower must be the national endowment of managerial know-how. Also, a higher output
per capita in the host country indicates a higher value of z2/z1, making the host country
12more attractive to foreign ﬁrms. Therefore, for the same level of s, domestic ﬁrms must be
more productive to compete with foreign ﬁrms. Finally, notice that country size also matters
because for a given share of inputs s, a larger host country requires a larger inﬂow of ﬁrms
from the source country. Everything else constant, this can only take place if ﬁrm-embedded
productivity is relatively lower in the host country.
We now show that this basic idea of using observed aggregate data {Y i,L i,s} to infer xi
and zi carries out much more generally than in this basic model.
3. Model Extensions
We extend the basic model along three dimensions that are important to quantify the gains of
internationally reallocating ﬁrm-embedded productivity. First, we consider geographic and
policy barriers. Second, we introduce physical capital accumulation. Finally, we endogenize
the number of ﬁrms and introduce two layers of management.
We consider each extension in isolation and show how they aﬀect the world equilibrium.
We then combine all the extensions and show how to infer the country- and ﬁrm-embedded
productivities using aggregate data and the equilibrium conditions of the model.
3.1. Geographic and Policy Barriers
In the basic model we assumed that managers have the same know-how when they operate
in their home country or in a foreign country. In reality, we can expect that ﬁrm-embedded
productivity may erode when ﬁrms operate abroad due to geographic and cultural barri-
ers in the host country, or lost connections and local knowledge from their home country.
These geographic barriers, or “gravity” considerations, are not part of the country-embedded
productivity because they do not aﬀect domestic ﬁrms.
We incorporate these considerations into the model by assuming that output of a ﬁrm
from country 1 operating in country 2 is z2 (θx1)
1−ν nν.H e r e ,i fθ<1 there is a home bias
in the location of ﬁrms since moving a ﬁrm from country 1 to country 2 entails an eﬃciency












We also assume that countries diﬀer in their tax on ﬁrms’ proﬁts. The government of
country i imposes a tax rate τi
F ∈ [0,1] on the proﬁts of foreign ﬁrms and a tax rate τi
D ∈ [0,1]
13on the proﬁts of home ﬁrms. We assume that taxes collected by each government are rebated
in a lump-sum fashion to national households. We view τi
F as proxying for a variety of barriers
faced by ﬁrms operating in a foreign country. As taxes are applied to proﬁts, they aﬀect
only the location of ﬁrms and not their hiring of inputs. The counterfactual quantitative
exercises reported below are based on variations in these tax rates.

















If in addition, taxes are such that (1 − τ2
F)/(1 − τ1
D) ≤ (1 − τ2
D)/(1 − τ1
F), then managers
from country 2 will prefer (strictly if the inequality is strong) to remain in country 2, elimi-
nating the possibility of two-way ﬂows.






























Here, the terms z1/z2θ
1−ν and x2/x1θ take the place of z1/z2 and x2/x1 in expression (2.8)
of the basic model. A low θ negatively impacts output and has exactly the same eﬀect on m∗
as a reduction in z2 and x1. Only the terms z1/z2θ
1−ν and x2/x1θ are relevant in assessing
the output and welfare gains of ﬁrm mobility.
Notice that if τ2
F >τ 1
D, then fewer ﬁrms ﬂow from country 1 to country 2 compared to the
undistorted case. Similarly, m∗ is higher if country 2 promotes the presence of foreign ﬁrms
by charging a tax rate τ2
F <τ 1
D. N o t ea l s ot h a tad e c r e a s ei nν, by increasing the weight
of ﬁrm-embedded productivity in production, increases the response of m∗ to a change in
taxes.
3.2. Physical Capital
When ﬁrm-embedded productivity can be reallocated across countries, the return of other
factors of production will be aﬀected as well. Consequently, an inﬂow of foreign ﬁrms will
boost capital accumulation in the host country importing foreign ﬁrms. This complemen-
tarity magniﬁes the output and welfare gains of allowing international mobility of ﬁrms.







14where k are units of capital services and αν is the output share of capital.










t denotes investment in country i, Ki
t−1 denotes the previous period capital stock,
and δ ∈ [0,1] is the depreciation rate of capital.
All ﬁrms face the same factor prices and country- and ﬁrm-embedded productivities are
Hicks-neutral. Therefore, the share of capital controlled by foreign ﬁr m si sa l s oe q u a lt o




























Notice that a higher capital stock is similar to a higher zi in that it raises the returns to
both foreign and domestic ﬁrms. For given capital stocks in each country, the allocation of



























A higher capital-labor ratio in the host country increases m∗ by attracting more ﬁrms from
t h es o u r c ec o u n t r y .
Over time, capital stocks will endogenously respond to the international reallocation of
ﬁrms. From equations (3.6) and (3.7), a higher m raises the marginal product of capital in
the host country and reduces it in the source country. In a steady state with no country-
speciﬁc distortions on capital accumulation, the marginal products of capital (ανY i/Ki)a r e





















If we start in a steady state with no ﬁrm mobility and it is optimal to reallocate ﬁrms
to country 2, then the output gains will be magniﬁed by the enhanced rate of return and
accumulation of capital.
153.3. Heterogeneity, Occupation Choice, and Local Management
We now endogenize the number of ﬁrms in each country so that ﬁrms are in bounded but
elastic supply. We assume that individuals are heterogeneous in their managerial skills,
and each decides between managing ﬁrms or working for other ﬁrms. We also consider
ﬁrms with two layers of management. The ﬁrst layer is composed of “top managers” and
determines the level of ﬁrm-embedded productivity. The second layer consists of “middle-
level managers,” which we assume are internationally immobile. In this way, we capture
the fact that multinational operations are typically directed by managers from the source
country and lower ranks of management are conducted by nationals of the host country.
Indeed, the availability of highly qualiﬁed mid-level managers is often cited by multinational
ﬁrms as one of the main factors in picking a particular host country.10
Assume that the ﬁrm’s production function is extended to include “mid-level adminis-







where x is the know-how of the top manager that leads the ﬁrm.
The average skill of top managers (or the average ﬁrm-embedded productivity) in country
i is xi, and the average skill of middle-level managers is xi
a. Within each country, individuals
draw an idiosyncratic skill level e with c.d.f. F,s u p p o r t[0,∞), and mean one. Individuals
choose between becoming a top manager, a middle manager, or a worker. As a top manager,
an individual with idiosyncratic skill e controls a ﬁrm with ﬁrm-embedded productivity xie
and earns its proﬁts. As a middle manager, the individual supplies xi
ae units of intermediate
managerial services, which, multiplied by the market wage for mid-management services,
determines his income. As a worker, he supplies one unit of labor services and receives a
wage independent of e.
Given that earnings of managers (both top and middle level) are increasing in e while
earnings of workers are not, there is a unique threshold ¯ ei
0 such that individuals with e ≤ ¯ ei
0
are employed as workers, as in Lucas (1978). Since the earnings of middle and top managers
are both proportional to e, there is an indeterminacy in the allocation of individuals between
top and middle management occupations.11 However, the equilibrium uniquely pins down
10See, for example, Larrain, Lopez-Calva and Rodriguez-Clare (2001). Antras, Garicano, and Rossi-
Hansberg (2006b) also study the role of locally provided middle-level management in multinational activity.
11This indeterminacy is also discussed in Jovanovic (1994). It results from the fact that returns to middle




1,a sw e l la st h eo t h e r





1 is allocating individuals with e>¯ ei
1 to top managerial positions and
individuals with ¯ ei
0 <e<¯ ei






























1 =1, i =1 ,2. (3.11)
With heterogeneous ﬁrms we reinterpret m as the fraction of aggregate ﬁrm-embedded

























































1 that maximize global output, Y 1 +Y 2, subject to (3.11),a r e















































1 are the eﬀective productivities that take the role of zi and xi, respectively.13
The quality of local mid-level managers, xi
aξ
i
0, and the abundance of workers, F (¯ ei
0),
operate as a country-embedded factor. Note that if xi
a = xi,ah i g h e rxi augments both the
and top managers are perfectly correlated. If we assumed that the exponent on x in the production function
was 1 instead of 1 − ν, then the model would imply a unique allocation of individuals across occupations.
Our quantitative results are invariant to this alternative assumption.
12For similar reasons as in the basic model (proﬁts are proportional to ﬁrm-embedded productivity), we
can only determine the net fraction of aggregate ﬁrm-embedded productivity ﬂowing between countries. The
cross-section distribution of reallocated skills is indeterminate.
13In the fully extended model, we will assume that all occupations face the same tax τi
D, and therefore,
occupation choices are not distorted. See Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) for an analysis of taxation and the
distortions on occupational choice. We also abstract from other within-country distortions across domestic
ﬁrms (see, for example, Restuccia and Rogerson 2003, Caselli and Gennaioli 2005, and Guner, Ventura, and
Yi 2006).
17eﬀective country-embedded productivity (attracting foreign ﬁrms) and the ﬁrm-embedded
productivity of domestic ﬁrms (repelling foreign ﬁrms). The second force always dominates
(see expression 2.8), so that a higher x2/x1 implies a lowers m∗, as in the benchmark model.
The reallocation of top managers across countries interacts with the allocation of indi-
viduals across occupations within each country. From the expressions above, we can see that
∂¯ e1
0/∂m < 0, ∂ξ
1
0/∂m < 0, ∂ξ
1
1/∂m > 0,∂ ¯ e2
0/∂m > 0, ∂ξ
2
0/∂m > 0,a n d∂ξ
2
1/∂m < 0. A
higher m reduces the fraction of top managerial units remaining in country 1,i n c r e a s i n gt h e
marginal product of top managers and lowering the marginal product of middle managers
and workers. Some workers will switch to managerial positions, and the mass of managerial
skills will be reallocated from middle to top positions. In country 2, the reallocation of oc-
cupations and skills is in the opposite direction. The inﬂow of foreign top managerial skills
lowers the marginal product of home top managers and increases the marginal product of
middle managers and workers. Therefore, some managers switch to worker occupations, and
part of the mass of managerial skills is reallocated from top- to middle-level positions.
The reallocation of occupations within each country reinforces the reallocation of ﬁrms





1 at their autarky level. Let mA
be the resulting fraction of country 1 ﬁr m st h a tm o v et oc o u n t r y2 under these occupation





1 optimally adjust according to (3.14), (3.15), and (3.16)





1 at their autarky levels
is a lower bound on the gains of allowing ﬁrms to reallocate across countries. This margin
plays an important role when evaluating the gains of ﬁrm international mobility.






in a competitive equilibrium in which individuals take as given the international returns of
top-managerial skills, and the national wages of mid-level managerial skills and labor services.
4. Inferring Country- and Firm-Embedded Productivities in the
Extended Model
We now brieﬂy discuss the equilibrium allocations and our inference of zi and xi using
aggregate data in the fully extended model.
184.1. Equilibrium
For given capital stocks and fraction of foreign ﬁrms m>0, aggregate output in each country
is
Y








1¢αν ,a n d ( 4 . 1 )
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Following similar steps as in the basic model, the fraction m∗ that equates the net-of-taxes






















































, i =1 ,2. (4.5)
This condition is the analog of (3.14) extended to take into account the presence of capital.
Up until here, the capital stocks are exogenously given. If instead we consider a steady
state with no country-speciﬁc barriers to capital accumulation, then capital stocks will adjust
until marginal products are equalized in both countries, and the steady-state fraction of































Notice that with endogenous capital accumulation, the eﬀective country-embedded produc-
tivity has a bigger impact on the fraction of foreign ﬁrms in country 2 (its exponent is
1/(1 − α)ν instead of 1/ν).
194.2. Using Observed {Y i,L i,Ki,s,τi
F,τi
D} to Infer xi and zi
We now describe, as we did in the basic model, how the equilibrium conditions of the fully
extended model allow us to infer the relative values of xi and zi.




































Each extension generates additional considerations for our inference of country- and ﬁrm-
embedded productivities.
First, under geographic barriers (θ<1), the host country is not a level playing ﬁeld for
foreign ﬁrms. We can only infer the ratio of domestic to foreign ﬁrm-embedded productivities
that eﬀectively operates in country 2, e x2/θe x1. Similarly, we can only infer e z2θ
1−ν because
changes in e z2 and θ have symmetric eﬀects on observable aggregate variables Y 2 and s.
Therefore, the inferred levels of e z1/e z2θ
1−ν and e x2/θe x1 are independent of θ, so the presence
of geographic considerations do not change our calculations on the output and welfare gains
from ﬁrm mobility. To save on notation, we assume from now on that θ =1 .
Second, the presence of taxes modiﬁes our inference of e z1/e z2 and e x2/e x1.T h eh i g h e rt h e
tax rate τ2
F, the higher must be the country-embedded productivity of the host country and
the lower must be the ﬁrm-embedded productivity of its local ﬁrms for the equilibrium to
imply the same fraction s of inputs controlled by foreign ﬁrms. Therefore, with measures of
τ2
F and τ1
D, we can proceed with our inference.
Third, the presence of capital does not modify the inference of e x2/e x1 since it aﬀects
symmetrically both domestic and foreign ﬁrms. Moreover, given that the capital stock
aﬀects productivity of all ﬁrms, we need to include measures of Y i/Ki to infer e z1/e z2.N o t e
that with e z1/e z2 and e x2/e x1,w ec a na l s oc o m p u t et h eg a i n so fﬁrm mobility across steady
states using expression (3.9).
Fourth, if we include top- and middle- level management but abstract from occupation
reallocation after a shift in policy, then e zi and e xi are also ﬁxed and we do not require assump-
tions on F (·) and γ to compute the equilibrium m and s. When individuals can reallocate
20among occupations, we need additional assumptions on γ and F,w h i c hp a r a m e t r i z eh o w
substitutable individuals are across occupations. Using the occupation choice conditions




1, and F (¯ ei
0),a n dw i t ht h o s ea t




We now proceed to the quantitative analysis, ﬁrst extending the model to a multicountry
setting, then describing the data and parameter values, and then reporting the country- and
ﬁrm-embedded productivity obtained from the model.
5.1. The Multicountry Model
Consider now a world economy composed of I countries. Country i =1is the only source
country of foreign ﬁrms, and countries i =2 ,3,...I are the host countries. In our quantitative
exercises, country 1 is an aggregate of 16 net source countries which happen to be mostly
developed countries, and countries 2,3,...I are net recipient, mostly developing countries.
We assume perfect capital markets within each country. Therefore, the consumption
of all individuals in country i at time t is equal to aggregate consumption divided by the
population, Ci
t/Li














The representative agent in each country can borrow and lend at the world risk-free rate
r∗, and we assume the standard no-Ponzi-game condition. The discount factor is equal to the
inverse of the world interest rate. Countries start with a zero position of net foreign assets.
This assumption only aﬀects the allocation of consumption and not the determination of
output and the inference of zi and xi. For simplicity, we abstract from the world equilibrium
determination of the interest rate r∗.
The model boils down to a multicountry neoclassical growth model together with the
endogenous determination of the share si
t of inputs controlled by country 1 ﬁrms in country
i in period t. The representative household in each country i chooses consumption, capital
accumulation, and the purchase of foreign assets, which are ﬁnanced by aggregate returns
to labor, physical capital, ﬁnancial assets, and the proﬁts of the ﬁrms. Tax rates in each
21country are rebated lump-sum to national households. All those details are standard, and
we explain them in Appendix A.
5.2. Equilibrium
We consider equilibria in which country 1 i st h es i n g l es o u r c ec o u n t r y . T h ee q u i l i b r i u m
determines the vector of fractions
©
m1,m 2,....,mIª
of country 1 ﬁrms, where mi denotes the
fraction of country 1 ﬁrms operating in country i.
Solving for the equilibrium in a multicountry setting is conceptually identical as in the
two-country case. The fraction m1 determines the proﬁts π1
1 of ﬁrms remaining in country
1, and after-tax proﬁts (1 − τ1
D)π1
1 are the benchmark for all potential host countries. For


























1 denotes proﬁts of country 1 ﬁrms in country 1. All the general equilibrium inter-
actions between host countries is via π1
1. For example, a change in τ
j
F, impacts country l
through changes in the returns of foreign managers in the source country.
Appendix B describes a simple algorithm to solve for mi and si in each country.
5.3. Inferring zi and xi
As before, we can infer the unique values of e zi/e z1 and e xi/e x1 consistent with observed data on
{Y i,L i,Ki,s i,τi
F,τi
D}. In Appendix C we describe the steps, which are virtually the same




































1, and F (¯ ei
0), and with those the values of zi (xi
a)
γν and xi.
We now derive a simple condition, in terms of observable data, under which country i is
an attractive location for country 1 ﬁrms. A host country is attractive if a social planner
that maximizes world output reallocates some country 1 foreign ﬁrms to country i when all
other host countries remain in autarky.

















This is the condition under which the marginal product of a ﬁrm is higher in country i than
in country 1.
In Appendix C we show that, using expressions (5.3) and (5.4), a suﬃcient condition for
Ri










Thus, if we observe a high si despite observing also a high τi
F, it must that the host country
is attractive to foreign ﬁrms. Note that we can have Ri
static > 1 (so that the host country is
not attractive) even if we observe si > 0,w h e nτi
F is low relative to τ1
D (i.e., when the host
country is providing tax incentives to foreign ﬁrms).
Consider now facing the social planner with the same decision but allowing him to also
adjust capital without country-speciﬁc barriers. The social planner would reallocate ﬁrms













In Appendix C we show that, using expressions (5.3) and (5.4), a suﬃcient condition for
Ri















If despite the scarcity of capital in country i (low Ki/Y i), we observe that it attracts foreign
ﬁrms, then with undistorted accumulation of capital (that would lead to a higher Ki/Y i)
t h ec o u n t r yw o u l db e c o m ee v e nm o r ea t t r a c t i v e .
In the data, a country might have a low capital-output ratio Ki/Y i b e c a u s ei ti sf a rf r o m
the steady-state level of capital, or due to distortions (e.g., taxes) and other considerations
(e.g., diﬀerences in relative prices) that aﬀect the steady-state accumulation of capital. The
cross-country variation in Ki/Y i, which we use to infer Ri
SS, is outside the scope of our
m o d e l ,a n dw et a k ei ta se x o g e n o u s l yg i v e n .
235.4. Data
We ﬁrst discuss how we measure the share of inputs controlled by foreign ﬁrms in each
country. In our model, top managers determine the productivity of factors of production
under their control. Since ﬁrm-embedded productivity is a Hicks neutral term, the fraction
of physical capital and the fraction of eﬃciency units of labor controlled by foreign ﬁrms are
equal within each host country. Our benchmark measure is based on the share of capital
controlled by foreign ﬁrms. As a robustness check, we also construct an alternative measure
based on employment.
We use the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) to proxy for the capital of those ﬁrms
in which foreign managerial know-how has a direct inﬂuence on their activities. The notion
of FDI in the data is closely connected to the cross-country reallocation of managerial know-
how and control in our model since it represents investments undertaken with the objective
of establishing a lasting interest in the country, a long-term relationship, and signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on the management of the ﬁrm. However, the stock of FDI is only an imperfect
proxy for foreign controlled capital since some of the FDI may not carry any eﬀective control
by investors, and also some capital controlled by foreigners may not be registered as FDI.
Moreover, FDI partly includes the purchase of assets such as intangibles or natural resources
that are not usually counted as physical capital.
We use the stocks of FDI constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) on the basis of
cumulative FDI ﬂows and reinvested proﬁts. A country is a net recipient of FDI when the
ratio of direct investment assets (outward FDI) to direct investment liabilities (inward FDI)
is less than one. Figure 1 displays, for a large set of countries, the geometric average for the
period 1997-2000 of the ratio of assets to liabilities. The ﬁgure shows that there is a sharp
divide between developed countries (typically net sources of FDI) and developing countries
(typically net hosts of FDI). While a handful of developed countries have very high ratios,
most developing countries have ratios that are close to zero. Notice, however, that some
developed countries, such as the United States, have both large assets and large liabilities.
We construct a single source country, indexed by i =1 , consolidating the data of the
major 16 net source countries into our country 1.W ec o n s i d e r38 net hosts that are mainly
developing countries or countries that have recently developed, such as Ireland and Spain. We
abstract from ﬂows from developing to developed countries or to other developing countries,
since for the most part, they are minor sources of total FDI. The set of countries included
24in our analysis is listed in Appendix D.
For each host country, we construct the share of foreign-controlled capital as
s
i =
stock of inward FDI in country i
total capital stock in country i
.
Total capital stocks are constructed using the standard permanent inventory scheme on the
investment reported in the Penn World Tables, Version 6.1 (PWT), assuming an annual
depreciation rate of 6%.
Table 1 displays the shares si, as well as other aggregate variables including GDP, capital-
output ratios, and the labor force (all three from PWT) for each host country relative to the
net source aggregate. All the data corresponds to averages between 1997 and 2000. Columns
1—3 show that most net host countries are relatively poorer, smaller, and have lower capital-
output ratios than the net source aggregate. Indeed, relative to source countries: (i) only
Ireland has a higher per capita output; (ii) only China and India are close or larger in size;
and (iii) only Thailand, Spain, and Greece have higher capital-output ratios. As can be seen
in column 4, a signiﬁcant share of the capital stock in these net host countries is controlled
by foreign ﬁrms. The average share is 16%, and is as high as 49% in Ireland and as low as
2% in Iceland.
Our alternative measure of si is the ratio of total wages paid by multinationals to total
wage payments in the host country. This measure indicates the share of eﬃciency units of
labor controlled by multinationals. An important limitation in constructing this measure is
that, for most host countries, we only have data on wage payments by U.S. multinational
ﬁrms. To proxy for total wage payments by multinationals we assume that, consistent with
t h em o d e l ,t h er a t i oo fU St ot o t a lm u l t i n a t i o n a lw a g ep a y m e n t si se q u a lt ot h er a t i oo fU S
to total inward stocks of FDI in each host country. Note that the possible biases of FDI as a
measure of eﬀective control will be mitigated if they do not systematically diﬀer for inﬂows




Wages paid by U.S. MNC in country i
Total wages in country i
×
stock of inward FDI in country i
stock of U.S. FDI in country i
.
To construct this measure, we obtain the data on total wages and salaries payments by
U.S. multinational ﬁrms and on the stock of outward US FDI in each host country from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The total stock of inward FDI is from Lane and
25Milesi-Ferretti (2006), and the total labor income in the host country from the World Bank
Development Indicators.14 Appendix D lists the reduced set of countries for which this
alternative measure of si is available.
To measure the tax faced by domestic ﬁrms in the source countries, we set τ1
D =0 .3,w h i c h
is consistent with the average corporate tax rate in our set of developed countries reported
in Ernst and Young’s Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide for the year 2002. To measure the
taxes on foreign proﬁts we follow Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004), and calculate the eﬀective
income tax rates paid by foreign aﬃliates of U.S. Multinationals in each host country. We







net foreign income + foreign income taxes
.
Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) and Gordon and Hines (2002) argue that this is an imperfect
yet informative measure of the barriers on international ﬁrms. We take those taxes as also
proxying for other policy barriers to foreign ﬁrms.15 Column 5 in Table 1 shows that the
average tax for the period 1997-2000 is 32%, only slightly higher than τ1
D. However, there is
signiﬁcant variation across host countries, with τF =5 6 %in India and 52% in Turkey, and
τF =9 %in Ireland.
We also conduct our inference and policy counterfactuals using two alternative measures
of taxes. Under the ﬁrst alternative we assume that, due to worldwide taxation clauses,
country 1 ﬁr m sf a c eam i n i m u mt a xr a t eτ1















Under the second alternative we assume that foreign ﬁrms may be able to deliver foreign
proﬁts without paying taxes to the government in the source country. In this case, the
eﬀective tax rate τ
m,i












14Consistent with our model and evidence in Gollin (2002), we assume a constant labor share of income
across host countries.
15For example, starting in 1989, Mexico eliminated some restrictions on foreign ownership of ﬁrms. For a
detailed discussion of this policy change, see Perez-Gonzales (2005).
265.5. Parameter Values
The key parameters of the model are those of the production function (ν, α, γ), and the
distribution of skills F (·). They determine the gains of reallocating top managers across
countries, individuals across occupations, and the gains from accumulating capital. These
are the key margins in shaping the output and welfare consequences of changes in the barriers
to foreign ﬁrms. To quantify the importance of each margin, we sequentially add one at a
time.
The parameter ν is central in shaping the response in the inﬂow of foreign ﬁrms to a
change in barriers. We do not use information about the change in the share s over time








we use information on the relative size of domestic versus foreign ﬁrms in host countries,
as the model determines only the aggregate ξ
i
1.W ec h o o s et h ev a l u eo fν based on existing
estimates on the degree of decreasing returns to scale in span-of-control models applied to
U.S. data. We set ν =0 .85, and report the sensitivity of our results to assuming ν =0 .8
and ν =0 .9, which is roughly the range for ν in this literature.16
The parameter α is important in shaping the response of capital to the inﬂow of foreign
ﬁrms. In our benchmark calibration, we set α =0 .35 so that the output share of capital is
roughly equal to the standard value of 0.3. We also report results assuming a lower value of
α.
The shape of F (·) and the value of γ determine the quantitative importance of occupa-
tion reallocation in response to the inﬂow of foreign ﬁrms. We assume that F is a Pareto
distribution with mean one and slope parameter b =1 .25. Under this parametrization, and
assuming that high idiosyncratic ability individuals sort into top managerial positions,17 the
right-tail ﬁrm size distribution of the model is in line with the U.S. ﬁrm size distribution for
middle- and large- sized ﬁrms.18
We set γ so that, in the equilibrium with the observed shares of foreign ﬁrms in host
16Atkeson, Kahn, and Ohanian (1996), Atkeson and Kehoe (2006), and Amaral and Quintin (2005) use
ν =0 .85. On the high side, Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) use v =0 .9. On the low side, Guner, Ventura, and
Xu (2006) use ν ' 0.8.
17This is the unique optimal sorting of the population in the presence of an inﬁnitesimal ﬁxed cost of
setting up a production team.
18Luttmer (2006) discusses in detail how the right tail of the U.S. ﬁrm size distribution resembles a
Pareto distribution. We choose the slope parameter b to target the employment-based right tail coeﬃcient
of size 2500 − 10000,e q u a lt o−0.25 on average between 1999 and 2003.T h i ss l o p ec o e ﬃcient is deﬁned as
[log(N10000) − log(N2500)]/[log(10000) − log(2500)]. Here, Nx corresponds to the total employment of
ﬁrms of size larger than x.
27countries, 10% of the labor force in the source country is in managerial positions (this is
broadly motivated from U.S. data), which implies γ =0 .1.19 These parameter values also
imply that γ/(1 − v + γ), the share of middle managers in total managerial compensation,
is roughly 40%. We also report our results assuming a lower value of γ.
Other parameters are set as follows. Taking each time period as a year, we set the
interest rate at 5% and the depreciation rate δ at 6%. The curvature parameter σ of the
utility function does not have any impact on our calculations given that r∗ is assumed to be
constant.
5.6. Inferred Country- and Firm-Embedded Productivities
Table 2 reports the inferred values of ˜ zi/˜ z1, ˜ xi/˜ x1, zi/z1, xi/x1, Ri
static,a n dRi
SS using our
procedure described above and aggregate data for the period 1997-2000.
C o l u m n s1 — 2s h o wt h a tt h ei n f e r r e dv a l u e so f˜ zi/˜ z1 and ˜ xi/˜ x1 are uniformly lower than
one (except for ˜ zIreland/˜ z1 =1 .2 ). This suggests that both country- and ﬁrm-embedded
productivities contribute to lower incomes in net host countries relative to net source coun-
tries. Notice also that for most countries, the values of zi/z1 and xi/x1 observed in columns
3—4 are higher than ˜ zi/˜ z1 and ˜ xi/˜ x1 in columns 1—2. This suggests that host countries use
managerial skills more intensively in mid-management or worker positions, both of which
complement the skills imported from abroad.
In order to quantify the relative variation in country- and ﬁrm-embedded productivity,
























Variation in output per capita can be accounted for by diﬀerences in four factors: (i) eﬀective
country-embedded productivity e z;( i i )e ﬀective ﬁrm-embedded productivity of domestic ﬁrms
e x; (iii) eﬀective ﬁrm-embedded productivity of foreign ﬁrms as proxied by the share of
19The number of managerial occupations as a fraction of all non-self-employed workers in 2005 in the U.S.
is 5%, as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), and Chari, Golosov, and
Tsyvinski (2004) report a fraction of self-employed workers of roughly 11%. From these ﬁgures, the fraction
of managers would be close to 15%. However, many of the self-employed are not likely to correspond to
our concept of managers. To be conservative, we assume that 50% of self-employed individuals are actual
managers of their own businesses. This results in a share of managers in the labor force of 10%. The lower
this fraction, the lower the implied value for γ, which reduces the gains from reallocating managers across
top and middle positions in the presence of international ﬁrm mobility.
28factors controlled by foreign ﬁrms si (a higher si and a lower m1 contribute to a higher
(Y i/Li)/(Y 1/L1)); and (iv) capital-output ratio K/Y .
Table 3 reports the relative importance of each of the four factors in (5.9) in accounting
for diﬀerences in output per capita between host and source countries (upper panel), and
variation within host countries (lower panel), under our benchmark parametrization of the
model. The gap in per capita output in the period 1997-2000 for source relative to host
countries can be decomposed as follows: 61% of the gap is accounted for by higher country-
embedded productivities, 27% from higher ﬁrm-embedded productivities of domestic ﬁrms
and 17% from higher capital-output ratios. Moreover, by importing foreign ﬁrms from source
countries, the host countries close the gap by 5%. The lower panel in Table 3 reports the
variance decomposition (a la Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare 1997) of the logarithm of output
per capita across the group of host countries. We ﬁnd that the share of each term in (5.9) in
accounting for the variance of output per capita in the period 1997 − 2000 is roughly 67%,
23%, 0.3% and 10%, respectively. These results remain roughly unchanged under our two
alternative measures of si, for the reduced sample of host countries for which both measures
are available. We also report the results under alternative values of ν (0.8 and 0.9). The
relative importance of ﬁrm-embedded productivity (both domestic and foreign) in accounting
for output per capita diﬀerence grows as we lower ν.
Before performing our counterfactuals, we can observe in columns 5—6, Table 2, the
inferred ratios Ri
static and Ri
SS that summarize the attractiveness of host countries to foreign
ﬁrms. The ratios Ri
static are lower than one in most countries (30 out of 38), making these
host countries attractive in the absence of other distortions. Moreover, Ri
static >R i
SS for
most host countries, which results from low observed capital-output ratios. If diﬀerences in
capital-output ratios stem from variation in distortions to capital accumulation, our analysis
serves to quantify the role of these distortions in making host countries more or less attractive
to foreign ﬁrms.
We can use expressions (5.5) and (5.7) to quantify the contribution of each variable
that shapes the cross-country variation in Ri
static and Ri
SS. Figure 2, panel A, plots Ri
static
separately against the two factors in the right-hand side of (5.5).N o t et h a tv a r i a t i o ni nt a x e s
accounts for much of the variations in Ri
static,b u tv a r i a t i o ni ns is also signiﬁcant. Figure 2,
panel B, plots Ri
SS against the three terms in the right-hand side of expression (5.7).T h e
ﬁg u r es h o w st h a tw h i l ev a r i a t i o ni na l lf a c t o r si ss i g n i ﬁcant, diﬀerences in capital-output
29ratios are the leading factor in accounting for variation in Ri
SS.
6. Quantifying the Gains from International Firm Mobility
In this section, we quantitatively assess the output and welfare consequences for the host
countries of eliminating barriers to foreign control of local factors of production.
We focus on the following counterfactual experiment. We assume that initially all coun-
tries are in autarky, and then consider the consequences of opening-up, such that foreign
ﬁrms are equally taxed at home and abroad. That is, τi
F changes from 100% to τ1
D =3 0 % .
We consider two alternative experiments. In the ﬁrst, each country opens-up unilaterally
and the rest remains in autarky. In the second experiment, all host countries open-up simul-
taneously. With these two experiments we quantify the gains for each country in isolation
and in a global liberalization.
In all cases we use the values of xi and zi inferred from the equilibrium of the parametrized
model, as described above, using the 1997-2000 data on output, labor, capital stocks, shares
of capital controlled by foreign ﬁrms, and measure of eﬀective taxes τi
F.
To isolate the role of various margins of response, we consider three alternative cases: (i)
ﬁxed capital stocks at their measured 1997-2000 levels (obs. K) and ﬁxed occupation choice
(ﬁxed OC); (ii) capital stocks at their steady-state levels (SS K) and ﬁx e dO C ;a n d( i i i )S S
K and reallocation of occupations (ﬂex. OC). In cases (ii) and (iii), our reported gains in
consumption take into account the investment required to increase the capital stock, and the
transition dynamics.
6.1. Unilateral Openness to Foreign Firms
Columns 1—2 in Table 4 report the results for case (i). The average gains across countries
are 5% for output and 1% for consumption. There is large variation in the gains, with some
countries gaining as much as 5% in consumption (Tunisia) and other countries not gaining
at all (e.g., Brazil, Venezuela, and Iceland). Figure 3, panel A, displays a strong negative
relationship between output and consumption gains and the inferred ratios Ri
static,w h i c h
summarize the relevant information on shares and taxes to assess the attractiveness of a
given country as a host of foreign ﬁrms.
Capital accumulation greatly enhances the gains in both output and consumption. This
is because the inﬂow of foreign ﬁrms raises the return to capital accumulation. Columns
303—4 display the gains under case (ii), where capital adjusts to the steady-state level. The
average gains are 14% and 6% for output and consumption, respectively. Figure 3, panel B,
illustrates the negative relationship between the gains to each country and Ri
SS.C o u n t r i e s
with a lower Ri
SS stand to gain much more by allowing foreign ﬁrms to operate within their
territory.
Reallocating individuals across occupations also magniﬁes the gains of ﬁrm mobility.
Shifting skills from top positions in domestic ﬁrms to middle management in foreign ﬁrms
complements the returns to importing foreign managerial know-how. Columns 5—6 display
the gains under case (iii). The average gains rise to 23% for output and 9% for consumption.
To help put these welfare gains in perspective, we compare them with those from alterna-
tive policy experiments that have received much attention in the literature on the gains from
globalization. One the one hand, we obtain larger gains than those from reallocating phys-
ical capital over time. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) report an average consumption gain
of 1% for non-OECD countries switching from ﬁnancial autarky to perfect ﬁnancial integra-
tion. On the other hand, we obtain smaller gains than those in models where productivity
is non-rival, such as Alvarez and Lucas (2004) and Eaton and Kortum (2002) (reductions
in trade barriers) and Ramondo (2006) (reductions in barriers to multinational activity).
In those models, in contrast to ours, productivity inﬂows in host countries do not involve
productivity outﬂo w si ns o u r c ec o u n t r i e s .
6.2. Global Openness to Foreign Firms
We now compute the gains when all host countries start in autarky and simultaneously move
to international mobility of ﬁrms, where now ﬁr m sa r et a x e da te q u a lr a t e sa c r o s sc o u n t r i e s .
Table 5 reports the results under the same three cases as for the unilateral policy changes.
As expected, the gains are smaller than under unilateral policy changes because host coun-
tries, by competing with each other to attract the limited supply of country 1 ﬁrms, increase
the value of π1. The average output and consumption gains for the host countries are, re-
spectively, 4% and 0.7% under case (i), 9% and 3% under case (ii), and 16% and 6% under
case (iii). Notice that, in spite of the competition among host countries, the average gains
from ﬁrm mobility are still quite signiﬁcant.
316.3. Sensitivity Analysis
In this subsection, based on the uncertainty regarding the value of some parameters and
measures of foreign control, we perform a sensitivity analysis. We report the gains from
the policy counterfactuals under our two alternative measures of input shares controlled by
foreign ﬁrms, as well as under our two alternative tax measures discussed in Section 5.4. We
also explore the sensitivity of the results to variations in parameters ν, α and γ.I na l lt h e s e
cases, we infer zi and xi using our inference procedure under each alternative parametrization,
and calculate the average output and consumption gains for each host country of unilateral
openness under case (iii) (i.e., allowing adjustment of capital and reallocations of individuals
across occupations). The results are reported in Table 6.
T h eg a i n sa r eh i g h e rw h e nw eu s eτ
M,i
F =m a x{τ1
D,τi
F} — columns 3—4, as our measure
of taxes on foreign ﬁrms in the identiﬁcation scheme. Now the barriers on foreign ﬁrms
are larger than under our benchmark parametrization, so our identiﬁcation scheme infers
that host countries are more attractive (i.e., lower levels of Ri
SS). The average output gain
increases from 23% to 26%, and the average consumption gain increases from 9% to 10%.
On the contrary, if we use τ
M,i
F =m a x {τ1
D,τi
F} — columns 5—6, output and consumption
gains are reduced to 17% and 6%, respectively.
As discussed above, there is some uncertainty regarding the output share of ﬁrm-embedded
productivity, 1−ν. We report the sensitivity of our quantitative ﬁndings to assuming ν =0 .8
and ν =0 .9, which is roughly the range for ν in the literature that calibrates similar span-of-
control models using US data. Assuming ν =0 .8 — columns 7—8, the gains rise to an average
of 30% in output and 12% in consumption. Assuming ν =0 .9 — columns 9—10, the gains fall
to 16% and 7%, respectively.
We now consider a lower value of the output share of capital and mid-level managers. If
we assume a value of α such that the capital share in output is 20% (as in Atkeson and Kehoe
2005) — columns 11—12, the output and consumption gains fall to 15% and 5%, respectively.
A lower share of capital in output reduces the gains of ﬁrm mobility by reducing the ability
of the host economy to complement the inﬂow of foreign ﬁrms with capital accumulation.
Assuming γ =0 .05 — columns 13—14, the output and consumption gains fall to 19% and
8%, respectively. A lower γ reduces the ability of the host economy to reallocate the skills
from top managers of local ﬁrms to mid-level managerial positions in foreign ﬁrms and labor,
both of which are complementary to foreign ﬁrm-embedded productivity.
32Finally, we compare the gains under our two alternative measures of si, for the reduced
set of countries for which both measures are available — columns 15—18. Under the FDI
stocks-based shares, the average gains are 18% for output and 7% for consumption. Under
the employment-based shares, the gains are 17% for output and 6% for consumption.
Overall, the alternative parameterizations and measures of foreign controlled inputs and
taxes still imply large gains in output and consumption that are on the same range as those
under our baseline parameterization.
7. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we construct a multicountry model of cross-country income diﬀerence to study
the international ﬂows of managerial know-how and control from developed to developing
countries. Using the model and aggregate data, we decompose cross-country productivity
diﬀerences into components that can be moved across countries and components that cannot
be moved across countries. Based on this decomposition, we conduct policy counterfactuals
that suggest signiﬁcant output and welfare gains of eliminating barriers to foreign control of
local factors of production.
Using our framework, we back-out the relative endowments of ﬁrm-embedded produc-
tivity that can account for observed measures of foreign control of inputs in developing
countries. Our paper is silent about the accumulation of this component of productivity. An
important area for further research is to characterize the gains of reallocating ﬁrm-embedded
productivity across countries in models in which it can be accumulated.
Our aggregate quantitative framework does not encompass many interesting issues related
with multinational activity, such as diﬀerences in the organization of production, ﬁnancial
structure, and export behavior across countries, sectors, and ﬁrms. In future research, we
plan to extend our framework to address some of these features and, in combination with
more detailed information at the level of sectors and ﬁrms, provide a better understanding
of the measured diﬀerences in country- and ﬁrm embedded productivities, and the impact
of institutional frictions on the aggregate productivity of host countries.
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A. Characterizing Equilibria in the Multi-Country Model
















































t ,( A . 2 )
the law of motion of capital is given by (3.5), and the law of motion of xi
t is given by (??).
The initial capital stocks Ki
0 and foreign assets Ai
0 are given.
Assuming β (1 + r∗)=1and perfect foresight, the level of foreign assets can be solved






¢−σ. The optimal capital choice satisﬁes
1=β [1 − δ + ανY i
t /Ki
t].

























1,( A . 4 )




















1 − si,( A . 6 )







0 edF (e)=1 .





























































i , i =2 ,...,I.( A . 8 )
Proﬁts in country 1 of a domestic manager with idiosyncratic skill e =1are
π
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34The share of factors controlled by country 1 managers in country i is
s
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B. Separating z1/zi from xi/x1 in the Multicountry Model
S u p p o s ew em a k ea s s u m p t i o n so nα, γ, ν, F (.) and we observe data on {Y i,L i,Ki,s i,τi
D,τi
F}
at a point in time. We now describe the algorithm to uncouple z1/zi fromxi/x1. We normalize
x1 =1 , and we always assume interior solutions.
1. Guess m1.
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and e xi = xiξ
i
1.





































8. Adjust m1 until
PI




The condition that equalizes the net-of-tax marginal product of country 1 ﬁrms in countries

























1¢ν .( C . 1 )
For simplicity but without loss of generality, we will assume that occupation margins
are ﬁxed. Suppose that country i is in autarky in the sense that there are no foreign ﬁrms
operating therein (mi =0 ,a n dm1 = m1
A). Suppose that τ1
D = τi
F, and the capital stocks
are ﬁxed. Then, using (C.1), foreign ﬁrms will want to move to country i (that is, mi > 0)
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where m1
M corresponds to the level of m1 in the algorithm described in Appendix B. Note
that m1
A >m 1
M, if the remaining countries maintain the same policies and capital stocks
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In the body of the paper, we can use this condition to quantify the sources of variation in
Ri
static.
36Now suppose that, in the model, the capital stock adjusts every period so that the


























1−αν .( C . 5 )
Suppose that country i is in autarky in the sense that no foreign ﬁrms are operating therein
(mi =0 ,a n dm1 = m1
A). Suppose that τ1
D = τi
F, and the capital stocks adjust every period
to equalize world-wide marginal products of capital. Then, using (C.5), foreign ﬁrms will
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D. Sample of Countries
Country 1: It is constructed as the aggregate of 16 developed countries: Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Switzerland, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan,
South Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United States.
Host countries i =2 ,...,38: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru,
Paraguay, El Salvador, Uruguay, Venezuela, China, Egypt, Indonesia, India, Israel, Jor-
dan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Syria, Thailand, Botswana, Morocco, Tunisia, Spain,
Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Portugal, Turkey.20
Reduced set of host countries (when using measure of si based on employment
shares): Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras,
20Countries such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain are clearly more developed than the other
countries in the group. These countries, however, are net recipients of foreign direct investment. We
excluded New Zealand and Australia from the sample even if they are also large recipients of foreign ﬁrms,
because their FDI is mostly horizontally motivated.
37Jamaica, Mexico, Venezuela, China, Indonesia, India, Israel, Malaysia, Philippines, Thai-
land, Spain, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Portugal, Turkey.
T h eB E Ad o e sn o tr e p o r ta ﬃliate information (used to construct our measure of eﬀective
taxes τi
F) for multiple years for the following countries in our sample: Bolivia, El Salvador,
Uruguay, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Pakistan, Syria, Botswana, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia,
and Iceland. For those countries, we use the average τi
F of the countries in the geographic
r e g i o n sf o rw h i c ht h eB E Ad o e sr e p o r tt h i si n f o r m a t i o n .
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)      Figure 3: Gains for host countries from unilaterally moving from

























































































































































































n          Table 1: Aggregate data for sample of net host countries, 1997-2000
12345
Argentina 53.6 3.8 78.4 10.7 43.4
Bolivia 13.7 0.8 45.9 38.3 28.2
Brazil 37.7 15.2 74.8 7.4 21.1
Chile 49.7 1.4 63.3 33.8 23.2
Colombia 23.8 4.7 53.7 11.6 47.3
Costa Rica 28.5 0.4 61.7 18.0 25.6
Dominican R 30.2 0.6 42.5 23.5 10.6
Ecuador 23.5 0.9 81.7 4.8 28.2
Guatemala 26.6 0.8 33.0 18.7 19.2
Honduras 13.4 0.5 60.1 15.1 34.4
Jamaica 15.0 0.3 96.1 18.5 13.9
Mexico 46.1 8.3 73.5 10.0 30.0
Nicaragua 10.8 0.4 70.5 26.1 33.5
Peru 20.6 2.7 92.9 10.7 28.2
Paraguay 22.6 0.6 55.5 11.7 29.0
El Salvador 27.3 0.5 32.1 15.8 33.5
Uruguay 43.7 0.4 54.9 7.7 29.0
Venezuela 37.7 2.1 74.2 14.5 18.9
China 11.2 184.8 55.8 19.2 24.3
Egypt 26.9 4.6 23.9 32.8 44.1
Indonesia 18.3 20.3 62.9 6.5 45.8
India 11.8 96.0 40.1 3.8 56.4
Israel 86.7 0.6 97.3 5.5 21.7
Jordan 33.0 0.3 58.4 10.7 44.1
Malaysia 53.8 2.0 78.1 23.5 26.0
Pakistan 13.9 9.3 41.6 7.7 56.4
Philippines 16.5 7.3 64.5 10.0 22.9
Syria 32.1 1.0 40.3 40.2 44.1
Thailand 25.0 7.9 112.6 7.4 19.5
Botswana 41.5 0.1 52.2 20.4 47.9
Morocco 23.2 2.2 51.3 14.6 47.9
Tunisia 38.1 0.8 53.5 37.7 47.9
Spain 84.9 3.9 108.5 7.9 25.5
Greece 67.6 1.1 110.3 4.0 41.6
Ireland 116.2 0.4 62.9 48.6 8.8
Iceland 86.3 0.0 97.5 2.2 20.9
Portugal 66.5 1.1 88.1 9.5 27.2
Turkey 30.6 7.1 69.0 2.8 52.2
Median 29.3 1.1 62.9 11.7 28.6
Average 37.1 10.4 66.1 16.1 32.2
Max 116.2 184.8 112.6 48.6 56.4
Min 10.8 0.0 23.9 2.2 8.8
Computed on the basis of data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Lane and
   Milesi-Ferretti (2006), and Penn-World Tables.
Host country
Aggregate Data
           Values in %  Values as % of net source country
Yi/Li Li Ki/Yi F
i si                     Table 2: Model inference of country- and firm-embedded productivities
        (benchmark parametrization, 1997-2000)
123456
Argentina 78.8 35.6 84.1 39.2 0.70 0.60
Bolivia 42.1 8.0 49.1 10.7 0.64 0.42
Brazil 62.6 36.2 67.1 39.1 1.07 0.92
Chile 77.0 33.2 80.1 42.8 0.74 0.58
Colombia 57.2 14.6 65.8 16.1 0.63 0.44
Costa Rica 57.4 22.9 63.1 26.3 0.88 0.68
Dominican R 64.5 27.2 69.3 32.4 1.02 0.66
Ecuador 47.7 21.1 53.6 22.5 0.98 0.88
Guatemala 65.8 23.0 72.3 26.5 0.96 0.53
Honduras 38.9 9.8 46.1 11.1 0.79 0.59
Jamaica 34.6 13.8 39.6 15.9 1.04 1.04
Mexico 71.6 38.2 76.1 41.9 0.90 0.76
Nicaragua 32.9 7.0 39.5 8.5 0.70 0.57
Peru 42.7 17.4 48.5 19.1 0.92 0.89
Paraguay 52.6 18.7 59.3 20.6 0.90 0.65
El Salvador 69.4 20.1 77.3 22.8 0.79 0.42
Uruguay 75.7 37.6 80.8 40.7 0.94 0.68
Venezuela 62.5 34.4 66.6 38.6 1.02 0.88
China 35.3 9.0 42.0 10.4 0.89 0.65
Egypt 77.2 13.3 87.0 17.0 0.52 0.23
Indonesia 47.0 12.2 55.2 13.1 0.69 0.52
India 43.7 6.5 54.3 6.9 0.55 0.32
Israel 91.7 84.4 91.5 90.2 1.08 1.07
Jordan 66.1 21.7 73.6 23.8 0.68 0.50
Malaysia 75.9 40.1 78.9 47.7 0.82 0.72
Pakistan 47.1 7.4 57.8 7.9 0.53 0.31
Philippines 41.8 15.1 48.0 16.5 1.01 0.80
Syria 72.7 14.1 80.5 19.3 0.46 0.27
Thailand 44.0 24.5 48.8 26.4 1.09 1.18
Botswana 78.4 22.7 85.9 26.4 0.56 0.38
Morocco 57.2 13.6 66.0 15.3 0.60 0.41
Tunisia 74.2 16.3 81.5 21.7 0.44 0.30
Spain 88.3 76.7 88.7 83.0 0.99 1.04
Greece 80.5 49.9 84.2 52.9 0.78 0.80
Ireland 119.9 71.7 113.9 107.3 0.70 0.56
Iceland 91.2 87.9 91.2 92.3 1.13 1.13
Portugal 82.5 57.7 84.7 63.0 0.95 0.89
Turkey 61.7 18.7 70.2 19.7 0.62 0.49
Median 63.6 21.4 69.8 23.3 0.81 0.62
Average 63.4 28.5 69.0 32.5 0.81 0.65
Max 119.9 87.9 113.9 107.3 1.13 1.18
Min 32.9 6.5 39.5 6.9 0.44 0.23
Host country z ̃i/z ̃1 x ̃i/x ̃1 Rstatic
i RSS
i zi/z1 xi/x1                                                           Table 3: Accounting for cross-country differences in output per worker
1 2345
Decomposition (adds up to 100%)
Difference between Host and
Source Countries, 1997-2000
(average host vs. source)
1     Benchmark parametrization -118.4% 60.5% 27.2% -4.9% 17.2%
2 -118.4% 55.2% 35.4% -6.3% 15.7%
3 -118.4% 66.1% 18.6% -3.3% 18.6%
4      Reduced set of countries (FDI stocks) -111.3% 63.2% 26.4% -4.7% 15.0%




6     Benchmark parametrization 38.5% 67.1% 23.0% 0.3% 9.6%
7 38.5% 60.8% 29.9% 0.4% 8.8%
8 38.5% 73.6% 15.7% 0.2% 10.5%
9      Reduced set of countries (FDI stocks) 43.9% 67.0% 22.0% 1.2% 9.8%
























Argentina 6.8 1.3 13.4 5.0 26.8 9.4
Bolivia 8.3 1.7 22.7 10.1 34.4 13.0
Brazil 0.3 0.0 3.4 0.9 3.6 0.9
Chile 5.9 1.0 14.3 5.5 17.5 5.5
Colombia 8.4 1.8 21.2 9.2 41.2 17.6
Costa Rica 3.2 0.3 10.5 3.7 16.4 5.1
Dominican R 0.9 0.0 11.4 4.1 16.1 4.9
Ecuador 1.5 0.1 4.6 1.3 7.1 1.9
Guatemala 1.8 0.1 16.4 6.6 30.5 11.1
Honduras 4.9 0.7 13.9 5.3 25.9 9.0
Jamaica 0.7 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
Mexico 2.7 0.2 7.6 2.4 12.9 3.8
Nicaragua 6.9 1.3 14.7 5.7 22.7 7.6
Peru 2.5 0.2 4.4 1.3 4.6 1.2
Paraguay 2.9 0.2 11.5 4.1 21.7 7.2
El Salvador 4.8 0.6 22.3 9.8 41.5 17.8
Uruguay 2.2 0.1 10.6 3.7 21.0 6.9
Venezuela 1.0 0.0 4.7 1.3 3.7 0.9
China 2.6 0.2 9.5 3.2 15.2 4.6
Egypt 11.7 3.1 38.6 20.3 55.8 29.4
Indonesia 6.8 1.2 16.2 6.5 35.6 13.6
India 9.8 2.3 26.3 12.2 50.0 24.7
Israel 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0
Jordan 7.1 1.3 18.1 7.4 37.7 14.7
Malaysia 4.3 0.5 9.2 3.1 10.8 3.1
Pakistan 11.3 3.0 30.1 14.6 52.5 26.8
Philippines 1.1 0.0 6.6 2.1 10.4 2.9
Syria 13.8 4.2 34.3 17.3 48.1 23.2
Thailand 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Botswana 10.4 2.6 25.0 11.4 43.5 19.4
Morocco 9.2 2.1 23.2 10.4 42.9 19.0
Tunisia 14.5 4.7 31.3 15.4 45.6 21.2
Spain 1.3 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.0 0.0
Greece 5.1 0.8 6.6 2.1 12.6 3.7
Ireland 6.7 1.2 15.2 5.9 9.9 2.8
Iceland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Portugal 2.0 0.1 4.4 1.2 4.9 1.3
Turkey 8.6 1.9 18.3 7.5 39.5 16.2
Median 4.6 0.6 12.5 4.6 19.3 6.2
Average 5.1 1.0 13.7 5.8 22.7 9.2
Max 14.5 4.7 38.6 20.3 55.8 29.4
Min 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table 4: Output and consumption percentage gains for host countries of unilaterally moving
Host Country
Initial K and Fixed OC SS K and Fixed OC SS K and Endog. OC
from autarky to openness to foreign firms123456
YCYCYC
Argentina 5.0 0.7 7.4 2.4 16.1 5.0
Bolivia 6.4 1.1 16.0 6.3 23.0 7.7
Brazil 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Chile 4.1 0.5 8.1 2.6 6.8 1.8
Colombia 6.5 1.1 14.8 5.7 34.1 12.8
Costa Rica 1.3 0.1 4.4 1.3 5.6 1.5
Dominican R 0.0 0.0 5.3 1.6 5.3 1.4
Ecuador 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Guatemala 0.0 0.0 10.1 3.5 19.3 6.2
Honduras 3.1 0.3 7.6 2.4 14.8 4.5
Jamaica 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mexico 1.0 0.0 2.0 0.5 2.7 0.7
Nicaragua 5.0 0.7 8.4 2.8 11.7 3.4
Peru 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Paraguay 1.1 0.0 5.4 1.6 10.7 3.0
El Salvador 3.0 0.2 15.6 6.1 34.2 12.9
Uruguay 0.4 0.0 4.5 1.3 10.1 2.8
Venezuela 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
China 1.3 0.0 5.5 1.6 7.8 2.1
Egypt 9.8 2.3 31.6 15.6 49.9 24.6
Indonesia 5.1 0.7 10.4 3.6 25.4 8.7
India 8.7 1.9 22.8 10.1 46.9 22.2
Israel 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Jordan 5.3 0.8 11.6 4.2 26.5 9.3
Malaysia 2.5 0.2 3.2 0.9 0.2 0.0
Pakistan 9.4 2.2 23.3 10.4 46.7 22.1
Philippines 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.2 0.0 0.0
Syria 11.8 3.2 27.0 12.6 42.2 18.4
Thailand 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Botswana 8.4 1.8 18.1 7.5 37.7 14.8
Morocco 7.3 1.4 16.6 6.6 37.3 14.4
Tunisia 12.5 3.6 24.1 10.9 39.8 16.5
Spain 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Greece 3.3 0.3 0.8 0.2 1.9 0.5
Ireland 4.9 0.7 8.9 3.0 0.0 0.0
Iceland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Portugal 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Turkey 6.8 1.3 12.1 4.4 31.0 11.4
Median 2.7 0.2 6.5 2.0 8.9 2.5
Average 3.6 0.7 8.6 3.4 15.5 6.0
Max 12.5 3.6 31.6 15.6 49.9 24.6
Min 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table 5: Output and consumption percentage gains for host countries of globally moving
Host Country Initial K and Fixed OC SS K and Fixed OC SS K and Endog. OC
from autarky to openness to foreign firms                   Table 6: Sensitivity of counterfactuals to alternative measures of taxes and parameter values
                             Steady-state percentage gains of unilaterally moving from autarky to openness to foreign firms
123456
    Benchmark taxes Alternative measure of taxes
and parameter values
           τF=τ
Max
F          τF=τ
Min
F
Host countries Y C Y C Y C
Median 19.3 6.2 23.4 7.9 16.4 5.1
Average 22.7 9.2 25.7 10.3 16.8 5.9
Max 55.8 29.4 55.7 29.3 46.6 21.9
Min 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Alternative parameter values
            ν=0.8          ν=0.9             α=0.23            γ=0.05
Host countries Y C Y C Y C Y C
Median 23.7 7.3 14.8 4.9 11.0 2.7 15.9 5.3
Average 30.3 11.8 15.4 6.5 14.6 4.8 19.3 7.8
Max 79.5 39.7 34.9 19.4 37.9 16.3 53.0 27.1
Min 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
15 16 17 18
Reduced set of Countries
FDI Stocks-Based Employment-Based
Host countries Y C Y C
Median 12.6 3.7 11.8 3.4
Average 17.8 6.9 16.5 6.4
Max 55.7 29.3 51.2 25.7
Min 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0